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1.  Introduction 
International factors have been important in all democratising waves and especially in the 
most recent, although they have not been studied in great detail. This is also true for the 
so-called 'third democratising wave' (Huntington 1991), which includes the changes in 
southern Europe in the 70s, Latin America in the 80s, and what we shall describe here as 
the 'fourth wave' that affected central and eastern Europe in the 90s (see the first chapter; 
Szmolka 2016). This observation is also applicable to other democratisation processes 
and more geographically localised political changes that took place in Asia (e.g. the 
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia and Indonesia from 1997 onwards), in 
subsaharan Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Ghana and Senegal), and in the 
area of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), such as in Algeria (1988-1992), 
Jordan (1989-1993) and Turkey (from 1999-2007).   
Specifically, a good test of the differential treatment by international actors is 
provided by the Spanish (1975-82) and Algerian (1988-1992) transitions; the former a 
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great success and the latter conflictual and anomalous, given that it gave way to another 
authoritarian regime (Bustos García de Castro 2004). If in the case of Spain, the generous 
political and financial support of the SPD party of Willy Brandt and the German social-
democratic foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, to the PSOE in the early years of the 
transition has been well-studied (Muñoz Sánchez 2012) and the prior knowledge that the 
CIA had about the failed coup d'état of 23-F 1982 has been closely analysed by historians 
(Palacios 2010; López-Tapico 2011, among others)1, the details of international 
intervention in the process of political opening undertaken in Algeria is much less well-
known, despite the effort of some authors to unravel it (Thieux  2002; Moore 1994; and 
especially, Cavatorta  2009).  
The aim of this study is not so much to employ an international dimension to 
understand transition paradigms or theories of ‘resilient authoritarianism’, as a large part 
of this book does, but rather to contribute to the analysis from the perspective of 
International Relations’ theories. 
It is clear that both positive and negative international influences are crucial in 
some cases, and essential in others, in order to move beyond the state centred framework 
of Political Science. Therefore it makes sense to include a full chapter in this book on 
international processes linked to the Arab Spring. Some strong examples in different 
regional contexts of international processes affecting political change include the 
emulation and synergy generated between the Portuguese and Spanish democratic 
opposition (in the army, the trade unions and the press, for example) and the interactions 
of the Argentinian, Chilean and Uruguayan opposition starting from the women's 
movement. Similarly, firm pressure from external actors such as the European Economic 
Community and European social democratic parties to the transitions in southern Europe 
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and Latin America as well as the Vatican and the United States in Eastern Europe have 
been decisive. 
It is not only important to consider the support of states, because the role of 
International Organisations (IO), which is even less researched, is considerable. Poast and 
Urpelainen concluded in a recent empirical study that mere pertinence to an IO 
consolidated democratic regimes, particularly when they followed long military 
dictatorships; while it could not be said that they had an appreciable impact on the fall of 
authoritarian regimes (Poast and Urpelainen 2015). Richard Youngs, on the other hand, 
has critically analysed the question of the EUs promotion of democracy, along with other 
western actors such as governments, companies and NGOs (Youngs  2004; Youngs  
2010). 
Separately, the help of particular western countries to sustain and strengthen 
authoritarian regimes (both autocratic and totalitarian) and aggressive ethno-democracies 
in the MENA region has made the implementation of processes of political opening from 
the top and the materialisation of popular demands from below more difficult and 
impractical. It is not only the fact that some of these countries are among the key 
beneficiaries of US and EU aid. Israel and Egypt, for example, are among the main 
receivers of American military and economic aid in the world, respectively first and 
second in 2014 (Amoros 2015), and Morocco has been the main receiver in the south 
Mediterranean of EU aid through MEDA funds between 1995-2006 (Natorski 2008) and 
the second, after Palestine, of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
between 2007-2013 (European Commission 2014). More importantly is that many of 
these countries' political economies have fallen into the perverse circle of employing 
hydrocarbons/remittances, foreign-aid generated income and/or rent-seeking, together 
with heavy arms expenditure and/or military alliances in order to protect themselves, 
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which produces a dynamic that substantially increases the authoritarian and repressive 
resources of governmental regimes, thereby simultaneously generating an irresolvable 
'security dilemma' (Korany et al. 1993; Anderson 1995) and making themselves less 
vulnerable to foreign criticism due to their apparent stability. That ‘false stability’ of 
authoritarian regimes, which are frequently in conflict among themselves, does not allow 
them to be consolidated as states. As Lu and Thies have demonstrated very perceptively, 
despite the predatory theory predictions of Charles Tilly (1990), civil and international 
wars have had a negative effect on the construction and consolidation of states in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Lu and Thies 2013). 
However international aid can halt abruptly or in particular conditions. For 
example, the end of USSR financial support to single party communist regimes provoked 
their successive collapse in the early 90s, something that did not occur among other 
single party regimes that were not sustained by foreign support (Geddes 1999: 139-140). 
In other cases, only under certain conditions (an exogenous crisis of the regime and 
absences of alternatives to the liberal democratic model) has the US decided to withdraw 
its support for authoritarian governments (for example, in the Philippines and South 
Korea), enabling a democratic transition (Owen IV and Poznansky  2014). 
 In order to conclude this introduction, it can be argued that regarding the Arab 
Spring - in contrast with the majority of the third and fourth wave cases - neither the 
international (e.g. the world economic crisis and tensions with Russia over the Ukraine) 
or regional context (e.g. armed battles in Libya, Syria and Yemen, growing Iran-Saudi 
rivalry) have been favourable for political change. Neither have the leading global powers 
or international organisations stood out for their rapid and active support of the anti-
authoritarian uprisings. Furthermore, in some cases, some of these powers actually 
supported authoritarian regimes up until the very last moment (e.g. France in Tunisia) or 
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impeded their fall (e.g. Russia in Syria or Saudi Arabia in Bahrein), while in other cases 
the responses were slow (e.g. the EU), contradictory (e.g. the US in Egypt), or showed 
little enthusiasm (such as that from Brussels, see among others Hollis 2012; Tömmel  
2013). This question of direct foreign support and the regional context is analysed in 
various chapters of this book (11, 12 and 13), and so it is simply sketched out here.  
 
2. Theories of International Relations towards the Arab Spring 
Following the ‘democratic pause’ that the events of 2001 represented, some authors 
predicted the start of a new democratising wave from the eruption of the Arab Spring in 
2010-2011 (Blaydes and Lo 2012; Grand 2011; Howard and Hussain 2013), despite the 
scepticism of others (Diamond 2011). Diamond warned in 2011 that democratic 
processes were closing more rapidly and abruptly in a number of Arab countries than in 
other regions, with the unique exception of the rapid backlash of the ex-Soviet republics 
(Diamond  2011). In this sense, as the editor of this book points out in the first chapter, 
the Arab Spring involved processes of political change that could be authoritarian or 
democratic in nature, rather than democratisations in series, as had happened at the end of 
the 80s and start of the 90s in some countries of the region. 
 This chapter next turns to an analysis of these processes via the main paradigms of 
international relations: (neo)liberalism; institutional liberalism; social constructivism and 
critical theories, by drawing on their key reference authors2 and the main journals 
associated with them3: International Security* (neo-realism), Review of International 
Studies, International Politics*  and International Organization (liberal institutionalism), 
European Journal of International Relations* and International Theory (social 
constructivism) and Journal of International Feminist Politics, Millennium and 




2.1  (Neo)-realism and the Arab Spring  
Neo-realism, the main paradigm of International Relations, does not ignore the Arab 
Spring but it fundamentally conceives it in terms of power and more specifically, of state 
power. Power in this context is particularly measured in economic, military and 
technological terms. Changes in its distribution are, on the other hand, fundamental for 
the neo-realist theorists of International Relations. They argue that an uneven distribution 
of resources in the international system generates different ‘power structures’ (Waltz 
1979), which depending on the number and capacities of the principal states of the system 
will make up either a unipolar structure, a bipolar structure or a multipolar structure.4 The 
most powerful states in each possible structure determine the rules of the game of 
international society. The realists, attentive to historic changes, have fixed on the 
evolution of these structures (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity), and identified 
both emerging states that have achieved the status of ‘system powers’ and those that have 
declined and stopped being (world) powers.  
The countries of the MENA region are, clearly, peripheral in the distribution of 
power and although some aspire to being regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey 
etc.) none can be considered a power at world level. In realist thought, in which the 
current world structure is often defined as multipolar (although this is an object of debate 
within realism), no country in the MENA region would be considered a global power. 
However, their possession of significant energy resources (deposits and reserves), as well 
as their geographic location, has converted this region into a zone of world strategic 
importance due to its exporting capacity. These exports are directed at both developed 
economies and emerging countries (BRICS), which are predominantly net importers of 
petrol, with the notable exceptions of Russia, Canada, Brazil and Norway that are net 
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exporters).5 The MENA countries attract a certain amount of global foreign investment, 
even though their instability impedes their continued growth.6 For this same reason, 
foreign investment is normally limited to extractive infrastructures and public utilities, 
weakening the development of the industrial sector. 
Due, among other reasons, to the MENA countries peripheral condition, two of 
the main realist theorists, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer have been critical of 
American over-intervention and particularly scathing about US ‘meddling’ in Egypt and 
Syria, as well as in other MENA locations. This coincidence is worth noting as it 
emanates from two theorists who are identified with the two poles of realism: defensive 
(Waltz) and offensive (Mearsheimer). Waltz, who died in 2013, left us with a wake up 
call over excessive American intervention in the world, at the same time as he put 
forward a surprising idea that was already formulated in 1980, that a world with a nuclear 
Iran and other nuclear powers would be more secure (Waltz 2012; Joyner 2013). 
Mearsheimer argues that the strategic importance of Syria and Egypt for the US has been 
exaggerated, as their security and freedom of action are not conditioned internationally, 
and can only be limited from afar by the ascent of China, for which reason, the US should 
not intervene in those countries (Mearsheimer 2014).7 Along the same line, the ex-
secretary of state Henry Kissinger stated he was against a possible intervention in Syria 
(Kissinger 2012), as Robert Gilpin had previously argued in relation to the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 (Gilpin 2005). 
Realism does not completely ignore other types of changes, such as internal 
changes, although they receive much less attention. The changes affecting the economic, 
demographic, military or technological power of the states, which emanate from internal 
transformations, also concern theoretical realists. However, political changes are less 
important in this sense, unless they make society more cohesive, mobilise its citizens and 
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project that growing power abroad (internal balancing). Specifically this relates to 
revolutionary type processes, such as the Naserist Revolution in Egypt or the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. These political changes are an object of interest as they produce 
internal cohesion, civil and/or military mobilisation and a will to exercise power beyond 
national frontiers, by exporting, for example, the revolutionary or democratic model.    
Regime changes, and more specifically democratic transitions and liberalisation 
policies, are not a particular focus of attention except when they are linked with other 
changes in state power. Hence Esther Barbé (2007) argues that analyses based 
exclusively on political-military structures 'are incapable of capturing change factors' 
(Barbé  2007: 184-185). As is well known, in line with the realist vision, all states act in 
accordance with the same motive: that is the search for and maximisation of power, 
whether it is at the minimum level, survival (defensive realism), or at the maximum 
(offensive realism). In other words, whatever the nature of the state, democratic or 
authoritarian, revolutionary or traditional, its actions on the international stage will be 
governed by the same key issues: namely the ‘anarchy of international society’ and by the 
capacities of global powers. Therefore all possible changes of regime are interpreted and 
reduced to variations on the power of the state.  
Realism holds that the appearance of revisionist states, whether revolutionary or 
not, have been historically responded to (in an intentional or unconscious way) by 
military alliances that have finished with the territorial ambitions of the rebel state; 
whether it be Napoleonic France, Hitler's Germany or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
Specifically in the journal International Security (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology MIT, 1976- ) realist authors have been most attracted to the effect of the 
Arab Spring on military alliances (Crawford 2011; Beckley 2015). This issue has 
received almost as much attention as nuclear proliferation (Braut-Hegghammer 2011; 
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Bell 2015), alongside Waltz himself (2012) and the fight against Jihadist terrorism 
(whether it is al-Qaida or transnational Jihadism, see Hegghammer 2010; Long and 
Wilner 2014). However the journal’s leading themes during the Arab Spring (2011-16) 
have been petrol, wars and the role of hydrocarbons in conflicts (Shifrinson, Itzkowitz 
and Priebe 2011; Colgan 2013; Glaser 2013; Hughes and Long 2014). Also worth 
mentioning is an article about the majoritarian failure of regime changes by force 
(Downes and Monten 2013), which is a clear allusion to the policy followed by the US 
neo-conservatives in Iraq that, as noted above, has been criticised by the leading neo-
realists. 
Consequently, the changes underway in the Arab world are only important to 
realists in the extent to which they produce variations of power in the region, modify 
perceptions of state security (security dilemma), or restructure alliances with foreign 
states that have the status of world powers (external balancing). In principle both a 
country in transition and a country in conflict are considered to lose power on the world 
stage, in contrast to an emerging country that, because of its growth and its potential is 
closer to having the capacity of other powers (internal balancing). A country in conflict 
may also suffer intervention by other(s), end up weaker and even lose sovereignty (such 
as in the cases of Libya, Syria and Yemen, for example). However, if at the end of a 
period of democratic transition the country can become a model for the region, it may be 
able to increase its capacity of influence over their neighbours (soft power). Furthermore 
the instauration of a democratic regime in one country can significantly alter that 
country’s foreign policy by breaking or departing from the links its authoritarian regime 
had so far maintained. On the other hand, a strong legitimate political system generates 
cohesion and also, therefore, the capacity of mobilisation in its defence. The example of 
Egypt is clear. Although Egypt’s failed transition has currently resulted in an 
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authoritarian regime, as a democracy it could emerge again as a clear aspirant to regional 
hegemony, as has been left patent by its role as a mediator in the Gaza conflict of 
November 2012 (Associated Press 2012).  
It is clear that these changes can generate distrust and fear in neighbouring states 
that maintain authoritarian political systems, and that fear rapid contagion. In this sense, 
the overthrowing of regimes and the start of regime change in the region can increase 
conflict not only within societies, but also between countries. This defensive response 
appears to have been regularly repeated in the MENA zone due to the uprisings in 
Bahrein, Libya, Yemen and Syria.  
Finally, the ongoing transitions can have an impact on the alliances of world 
powers with the MENA states and lead to a potential redistribution of their areas of 
influence. At what point will the Tunisian transition, with Islamists playing a leading 
role, lead to France being displaced by the US in an area traditionally considered to be 
France’s 'backyard'? When will French military protection for Tunisia - maintained for so 
long out of fear of its unpredictable Libyan neighbour - stop being necessary?  
As for Syria, would not the fall of the Bachar al-Assad regime represent the loss 
of the last ally that Russia has in the MENA region? And are the Muslim Brotherhood not 
now weaving relationships with susceptible states to alter the region’s political map? If 
not, how can the withdrawal of Hamas’ support for the Syrian regime be interpreted? Is 
the Muslim Brotherhood not pushing, under the influence of Qatar, for a new Syria in 
which the Alawi minority will be replaced by Islamists from the Sunni majority? It is 
clear that in a potential scenario where Syria was governed by Islamist Sunnis, the 
country would definitively stop being within the sphere of Russian influence and move 




2.2  Liberal Institutionalism and the Arab Spring  
Within liberal institutionalism there coexists a pragmatic theoretical approach - that states 
cooperate among themselves when they all gain something (absolute gain) - with another 
normative – that the opening up of trade, investments and the development of democratic 
values and freedom are positive historical forces that cannot be detained. The former 
corresponds with the utilitarian focus of the neoliberal institutionalists (Keohane and Nye 
1977; Keohane 1984) and includes international regime theorists (Krasner 1982 among 
others; Rittberger and Mayer 1993), while the latter relates more to idealism at the start of 
the XX century and its intellectual tradition (from Grotius, Kant, Rousseau and Wilson to 
the recent theorists of liberal cosmopolitanism: Beck (1944-2015), Held, Doyle and 
Ikenberry)8. It is also consistent with the positivist or liberal current, dominant among 
internationalists or specialists in Public International Law.  
In general, institutionalists and liberals do not enquire about the origin of 
international forces, such as globalisation, or whether they are guided by a specific actor; 
they are considered to be invisible forces, like the market in the economy or the anarchy 
in international society. Institutionalists and liberals are acritical of a phenomenon that, 
from their perspective, only seeks to eliminate barriers and obstacles to a future 
standardisation of the world whose consequences will be more beneficial than prejudicial. 
Within their optimistic conception of history and time, market forces and human 
freedoms can only combine to bring about a more prosperous and safe world.  
The liberal institutionalist current is not only known for its emphasis on ‘complex 
interdependence’9, but in a more general way on globalisation, as they focus on a variety 
of global actors such as international organisations, NGOs, multinational companies, etc. 
that operate together with states. Neoliberal institutionalists consider the state and other 
actors to be rational subjects that pursue and define their objectives based on cost and 
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benefit calculations. Institutions are created and maintained because they reduce the 
transactional costs of state interaction and allow information to be generated and shared. 
Nevertheless, there is no reason for cooperation to prevail in every circumstance; this will 
depend on the specific 'constellation of interest' established in a specific negotiation or 
international issue. These constellations of interest can take distinct forms according to 
the participants and the issue under negotiation; forms that the experts of game theory 
have sought to categorise as distinct games: competitive, cooperative, and with or without 
coordination (Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck  2012: 21-23). 
In his empirical-rational analysis of institutions, Robert O. Keohane recently 
wrote that the Security Council is not the only institution with exclusive competence to 
maintain peace and that given its inability to abide by the 'Responsibility to Protect' 
(RtoP) doctrine, as well as its incapacity to reform itself, it should be complemented by a 
new institution, comprising of countries that are pre-committed to democracy (Buchanan 
and Keohane 2011).  
Along similar lines, David A. Lake has evaluated the benefit to the US of 
maintaining alliances or hierarchies with Persian Gulf countries, taking into account not 
only the cost/benefit but also the type of regime. According to his analytical model, the 
alliances or “hierarchies have distributive national and international consequences over 
coalition governments and the types of regime” (Lake  2013). According to Lake there is 
a relationship between the profits derived from that hierarchy (large/small) and the 
distance in citizen political preferences to the states in the alliance (short/long), on the 
one hand, and the type of regime that that hierarchy or alliance implies, on the other. In 
other words, where the profits are scarce and concentrated and the distance in the 
preferences are long (in the case of Central America and the Persian Gulf), the hierarchy 
will support autocratic friends. Conversely, there where the profits are big and numerous 
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and/or the distance between the preferences short (Western Europe), the hierarchy will 
support democracies. With time, the former model will generate a perverse circle, while 
the latter will create a virtuous circle. Under this prism and given the elevated costs of 
maintaining security in the Gulf region, including both the fight against terrorism and 
extending benefits beyond the elites, Lake recommends that the US withdraws from the 
zone and dismantles the structures of military and economic dependency that it has 
established with those countries (Lake 2013). 
In the journal International Politics (London School of Economics and Palgrave, 
1996- ) Michael Doyle (Doyle 2016) and Alex Bellamy (Bellamy 2014) write about the 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Libya and Syria. While employment of the doctrine in 
Libya did great harm (despite which its repeated practice will result in it becoming 
international common law), in Syria, opposition to the use of the RtoP is related to other 
factors in the neighbouring area. Doyle and Bellamy argue that neither Russia nor China 
have consistently raised the 'Libyan issue' in the Security Council and nor did the 
countries that most opposed the Libyan resolution slow down the draft proposal over 
Syria, and it therefore seems that IOs appear increasingly comfortable with the RtoP. 
Another interesting debate raised in the journal is that of the liberal (re) 
construction of states. While some articles have argued that there is a crisis in this model, 
liberal authors such as Hameiri contend that expansion will continue because the critics 
have only focused on the peace missions as an object of analysis and not the more general 
role that international institutions play (Hameiri 2014). Regarding security, while Cerny 
argues that the global extension of the liberal state, where armed forces give way to 
police, will occur within the rule of law (Cerny 2015), Williams contends that in 
Afghanistan this pattern will not be successful because the Afghan army formed by 
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NATO will finally prevail over the civil government due to the threats the country 
currently faces (Williams 2015). 
In contrast with the realists, liberals believe that the form of the state, its 
institutions and the values which govern it, is relevant for two fundamental reasons: first, 
to open the country internally and externally, and second to respect the rule of law and 
international norms. This translates into the following liberal premise: that states with 
open economies tend to trade more and more readily see cooperation as in their interest. 
Liberals further argue that states with open political and democratic systems prefer to 
resolve their differences by means of negotiation, respect norms (the rule of law) within 
and beyond their frontiers, and are more inclined to cooperation and peaceful interaction. 
These premises are summarised in the theory of ‘democratic peace' or 'liberal peace', 
which contends that democracies do not make war among themselves, but rather prefer to 
trade and resolve their differences by other means (Russett 1993; Weart 1998; Doyle 
2011). 
While the idea of 'democratic peace' has been criticised, it continues to be a pillar 
of liberal institutionalism. This explains why the changes in the Arab countries are very 
significant, whether they are seen from the perspective of the triumph of the liberal-
capitalist model and the end of history (Fukuyama), from the prism of democratising 
waves (Huntington), from the ‘flat world' of technological globalisation (Friedman), or 
from the social movements of the ‘network society’ (Castells). In the end, have the Arab 
uprisings not been possible thanks to the new information technologies of the internet, 
with social media at the head?  
The institutionalist paradigm argues that globalisation is a blind and unstoppable 
force that modifies international relationships in multiple dimensions, transforming and 
eroding the Westphalia order that has ruled since 1648. Leading liberal author Andrew 
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Moravcsik, who developed a 'structural theory' of liberalism, states: ‘Liberals argue that 
the universal condition of world politics is globalisation. States are, and always have 
been, embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for 
economic, social and cultural interaction across borders’ (Moravcsik 2010: 1). 
 Globalisation blurs sovereignty, de-territorialises the state and power and 
weakens the autonomy and independence of political communities (Baylis, Smith and 
Owens 2011). This generates problems of complex interdependence that enables or 
pushes states towards international cooperation. 
 
2.3  Social Constructivism and the Arab Spring  
Social Constructivism is the most recent International Relations theory to emerge. It was 
predominantly developed by Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999); although 
significant predecessors include Onuf,  Kratochwil, Ruggie, Katzenstein, and contributors 
such as Adler, Kubalková, Reus-Smit, Barnett, Finnemore, Sikkink and the Copenhagen 
school10 (in the area of security). 
Constructivism shares with other critical theories a normative as well as scientific 
vocation. It seeks to transform social reality by revealing the interactive processes that 
structure the interests, objectives and finally the identity of international actors. Both 
vocations reject the presumed objectivity or scientific neutrality and the net separation of 
the object and subject. However in contrast to critical theories, constructivism does not 
provide a general description of international relations nor a prognosis of how these 
relations will evolve. However because it is an essentially contextual and 'interactional' 
paradigm, the result is open, depending on the shared prior knowledge, values and 
experiences of the actors involved.  
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A central issue of social constructivism is the diffusion of norms, especially those 
that emanate from international organisations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). This 
connects directly with the Arab Spring and relationships with actors such as the EU in 
this area of the world. Regarding the diffusion of values, it has been some time since 
European political analysts argued that the EU is a 'normative power' or even a 'normative 
empire' (Del Sarto 2016), which diffuses values and norms throughout the world and 
primarily, in the Mediterranean and Arab world. The object of this liberal diffusion of 
ideas, apparently devoid of power and imposition, is to gradually transfer the values of 
democracy and market economy.  
It is clear that constructivist authors seek to distance themselves from the natural 
optimism of the liberals and suggest that the diffusion of norms such as democracy can 
have negative effects. Seva Gunitsky argues in a comparative study of the Arab Spring 
with the Spring of Nations (1848) and the Velvet Revolutions (1989) that this diffusion is 
not linear but rather a complex process of co-evolution and co-adaptation, which is 
characterised by dynamics that are usually contradictory. Futhermore, the diffusion is 
normally accompanied by a learning process of the authoritarian elite, who unleash 
greater repression, while specific democratic experiences are also successful (Gunitsky 
2013). 
Natorski (2015), for his part, has underscored that in times of crisis and 
uncertainty, like that which produced the Arab Spring and the institutional and economic 
changes in Europe (from 2010 onwards), actors such as the European Union employ 
social conventions such as ‘epistemological coherence’ as a means to give continuity to 
their neighbourhood policies, thereby avoiding having to make more drastic changes that 
would be necessary in a modified environment.  
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The European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) (European Consortium 
for Political Research ECPR, 1995- ) frequently debates the role of the EU in the world 
and its power of normative diffusion, as can be seen in the article by Kunz and 
Maisenbacher about the promotion of women in the MENA region, and in that of 
Natorski about the epistimological uncertainty before the Arab Spring. This is also the 
case of another article about the twinning policy in Egypt and Tunisia, and how this 
'brotherhood' has allowed technical knowledge and efficiencies to be diffused to the 
administrations of the Mediterranean within a neoliberal governance model (İşleyen 
2015). Equally successful has been the normative diffusion of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation since 1974, which through distinct resolutions, whether vetoed or not, has 
managed to develop a strong concensus within the UN Security Council that the 
Palestinians have a right to their own state and that this is essential for a solution, while 
the Israeli occupation is perceived as the main obstacle (Graubart and Jimenez-Bacardi 
2016). Another key issue in the journal has been the invisibility of certain actors that has 
led it to overlook micro-movements like the Arab Spring in which ordinary citizens and 
emotions are important (Sylvester 2013a) (Solomon and Steele 2016). Likewise, the idea 
that (epistemological) silence can constitute a form of violence in the theory and practice 
of international relations, is illustrated in the case of Yemen. The breaking of civil 
society's silence during the Arab Spring, argues the author, should not be interpreted as a 
monolithic voice in favour of individual freedom but rather as a heterogeneous group of 
social demands for dignity (Dingli 2015). 
Arab uprisings have, although only partially, brought down the western 
ideological prejudice that Arabs as oriental subjects accept a good degree of autocracy 
and despotism. This is one of the bases of Orientalism, which was so well analysed and 
denounced by the intellectual Edward Said (1979; 1993). The Arab Spring has 
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demonstrated that people in the MENA region desire freedom and dignity like any other. 
They have sought it with strength and astonishing determination, something that has not 
only perplexed observers and the public of the North in general but has made these young 
Arabs believe still more in their possibilities.  
The varying degrees of European and western support for Arab autocracies hinged 
in part on that belief that these societies had resigned themselves or had adapted to live 
without freedoms and democracy and that therefore they could only change gradually. 
The spectre of a worse evil than autocracies, personified by political Islam, provided 
convincing arguments for diplomats to maintain pragmatic relations with anti-democratic 
regimes. However once the revolutions and uprisings began, the western ‘mental veil’, 
which could not comprehend that Arab people wanted – like other populations - to pursue 
liberty and freedom, started to tear.  
This about turn in perception is Copernican and clearly marks a before and after, 
and is what certain critics, between constructivist and critical theorists, call the 
‘decolonisation of thought’ (Spivak, De Sousa and Mignolo). The changes in the Arab 
world have forced western thought to be deconstructed and ‘decolonised’ rather than 
continuing to see the ‘other’, those of the South, as different, passive, and therefore 
deserving of the oppressive reality that surrounds them, or as a primitive subject that must 
be ‘civilised’. Equally the west is striving to completely reconsider North-South relations 
in the Euro-Mediterranean space. As the French philosopher Alain Badiou recently 
argued, the North cannot expect to continue giving lessons when it has so much to learn 
from these revolutions, and this fact shakes western arrogance (Badiou 2012). It also 
implies putting an end to the paternalism of governments and societies of the North and 




These cognitive changes must certainly involve discussion about rights and 
liberties, but on both sides of the Mediterranean, because those rights and liberties are not 
the patrimony of particular countries and nor are they fully protected anywhere. However 
the EU has been determined to continue with its ‘civilising mission’ on the basis of its 
promotion of gender equality. As Kunz and Maisenbacher accurately point out, the New 
European Neighbourhood Policy, launched in response to the Arab Spring, recreates a 
geographically and temporally distant ‘other’ - just at the moment in which these 
countries are closer to Europe than ever - whether by emphasising the incorporation of 
the European law ‘community heritage’ or democratisation processes (Kunz and 
Maisenbacher 2015). It is appropriate for the South to allow its civil society to be 
‘empowered’ and become true co-participants in all Euro-Mediterranean initiatives. The 
changes imply that Arabs become wholly international subjects, free of illegitimate 
regimes but also of post-colonial relationships constructed around paternalism. To what 
extent is Northern paternalism receptive to the message that comes from the South and 
willing to reconstruct its relationships in the Mediterranean and other spaces?   
 
2.4  Critical theories and the Arab Spring  
An alternative analysis is put forward by critical theories, an umbrella term under which 
very distinct currents are grouped: post-positivists and post-modernists (Ashley, Der 
Derian, etc.), feminists (Tickner, Sylvester, etc.), neo-Marxists and neo-Gramscians (Cox,  
Gill,  Wallerstein, Van der Pijl,  Ali, etc.), and cosmopolitan radicals (Linklater, etc.), 
who have influenced International Relations as much as the theory of Public International 
Law (Kennedy, Koskenniemi, Falk, Chimni, Reus-Smit, Bachand and Lapointe).11  
These authors argue that globalisation is not a new phenomenon, nor distinct, but 
rather the deepening of a process of capitalist accumulation that started five centuries ago 
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with the conquest of America and that has been through distinct cycles in that period of 
time (Wallerstein 2004). They contend that economic processes are far from being an 
invisible hand that produces beneficial effects; rather that globalisation and the changes 
in the Arab world have been induced by well-known capitalist states. Peter Gowan, for 
example, explains how capital deregulation was decided upon and driven by the Nixon 
administration following the abandonment of the gold-dollar formula and was sustained 
afterwards, for the benefit of the economy and American banks that recycled the petro-
dollars of the Middle East to lend them to southern countries; a process that served the 
euro-dollar markets that connected Wall Street with the City of London (Gowan 2000a). 
While Immanuel Wallerstein is the best known, he has not been alone in arguing 
that some of the Arab riots were ‘remote-controlled’ by Washington and their European 
allies. On the one hand Wallerstein argues that the disturbances are healthy and inspired 
in May 1968, and on the other that there are reactionaries who seek to maintain the status 
quo by relying on foreign allies, as has been the case in Libya (Wallerstein 2011) and in 
Syria (Wallerstein 2012). Other authors suggest that the US provoked the riots to gain 
new markets for American businesses: was it not Facebook and Twitter, American 
companies, which facilitated and encouraged the process? Along the same line, Kees Van 
der Pijl, an influential critic from the Amsterdam School of Global Political Economy, 
repeated the information that after the coup d'état in Mali, Cheikh Modibo Diarra, who 
was up to that time director of Microsoft for Africa, had been appointed prime minister, 
and that Google had contracted various human rights defenders in Arab countries (Allard, 
cited in Van der Pijl 2013: 13).  
These authors argue that the differential approach of the US when faced on the 
one hand with the disturbances in Syria and Lybia, and the riots in Persian Gulf countries 
on the other, is proof of a hypocritical US discourse that does not hide market greed. The 
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way in which the US tolerated the crushing of the Bahrein riots at the hands of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council security forces, with Saudi Arabia at the head, reveals the double 
standards of the leading capitalist power. This is behaviour, it is argued, which openly 
contrasts with untiring support, in many forms, for the rogue states (as US authorities 
describe them) of Libya and Syria. 
Other theoretical neo-Marxists, such as the influential writer and journalist Tariq 
Ali, editor of the New Left Review,12 deny that the Arab Spring represents any 
fundamental change and argue that the North-South relationship has not substantially 
varied, except among specific leaders (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in 
Tunisia) who maintain links with the US (Ali 2013), but without altering their political, 
economic and military dependence on the North. Ali compares the Arab Spring with the 
advent of popular regimes in Latin America during the 2000s, which he named 
favourably ‘the axis of hope’, (Ali  2008) and argues that the current changes in the Arab 
world have not produced true revolutions that have replaced elites or that have been 
capable of slowing neo-liberalism and breaking with their foreign partners. This fact, 
argues Ali, is fundamentally due to the variable of foreign intervention in the MENA 
countries, especially of the US and its actions through their allies in the region (Israel and 
Saudi Arabia): “If the Arab uprisings began as indigenous revolts against corrupt police 
states and social deprivation, they were rapidly internationalised as western powers and 
regional neighbours entered the fray” (Ali  2013: 64). 
The journal International Political Sociology (International Studies Association 
ISA, 2007- ), which contains very diverse publications, has shown little direct interest in 
the Arab Spring (2011-16), but considerable interest in issues that cross the problematic 
of uprisings, interventions and conflicts in the MENA region. The Reflectivist focus is 
dominant in the journal, which frequently deals with aspects of the inter-subjective 
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production of security, ‘securitisation’, vigilance and biopolitics, both in relation to 
emigrants (Doty and Wheatley 2013; Johnson 2013) and prisoners of war in Guantanamo 
(Beier and Mutimer 2014), as well as the Palestinian population under occupation. It also 
critically considers the legitimacy (not only legal, but also ethical and political) of the 
military use of drones (Gregory 2015) and the limits of private security organisations 
(e.g. massive espionage, use of virtual reality by the intelligence services, immigrant 
detention centres, etc.). Resistance to the Palestinian occupation and in general to the 
processes of neoliberal globalisation (Corry 2014), are dealt with alongside the concepts 
and contributions of French sociological theorists (Foucault, Bourdieu, etc.). 
From feminist theories, Sylvester underscores the need to analyse everyday 
international practices from the starting point of individual experiences, both in the study 
of relationships in periods of peace as well as in current wars (Sylvester  2013a; Sylvester  
2013b) and criticises neo-realist theorists, for being excessively abstract and reductionist, 
with Waltz at the head:  
‘those who set themselves up as scientific authorities on the international 
system, all the while denying that official authority exists for that system, 
decide that anarchy means the absence of formal governance “out there”. They 
do not recognise that the political realm of no government is actually a gender-
ruled space that forecloses a potential site for (disorderly) “women” in 
politics’ ( Sylvester 1994 citado en Sylvester  2014: 550) 
 
The emphasis on war as a by-product of the Arab Spring is also put forward by 
the school of Global Political Economy. Authors like Van der Pijl link the stripped-down 
competition for capitalist supremacy with the use that the US makes of the ‘industrial 
military complex’: ‘My argument in this paper is that the United States (leading the 
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liberal West more broadly speaking) since the financial crisis of 2007-08 has been 
compelled to rely ever-more on its military assets to secure its global primacy’ (Van der 
Pijl  2013: 1). 
It is clear that these critical theories tend to extol and amplify the role of external 
actors to the point of becoming, in some cases, close to conspiracy theories. These 
approaches, even when not so extreme, consequently view the autonomy and decision-
making will of internal actors in quite a limited way (Wallerstein), unless they produce 
revolutions, and underscore the importance of economic and military factors, and their 
interaction as determinants of international policy (Ali and Van der Pijl). Others, 
however, such as feminist theorists, point to political and cultural factors that underlie 
and feed war and conflicts: specifically the invisibility of specific actors (women) and 
female agency in everyday experiences, which are hidden in dominant macro-theories 
(neo-realism) and their narratives (Sylvester). 
 
3. Conclusions 
This chapter showed above that, unlike previous waves of democratisation, neither the 
regional nor the global context has been particularly favourable for the Arab Spring. This 
does not mean, however, that international factors related to the Arab Spring should not 
receive greater attention. The chapter has also demonstrated how similar topics are 
treated in rather inverted ways. Thus while neo-realists tend not to focus on the Arab 
Spring itself but rather on the possible threats that derive from it (an increase in Jihadism, 
nuclear proliferation, etc.) and their consequences for alliances and US interests, critical 
theorists reverse the analysis and locate it in the economic causes and implications of 
armed interventions (e.g. neoliberalism, distribution of markets, the military leverage of 
US hegemony) as well as the social processes of vigilance and control that are associated 
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with the “security obsession” (e.g. census elaboration, detention centres, massive 
espionage, “biopolitics”, etc.). 
 For their part, liberals and institutionalists move between rational calculations 
relating to the utility of institutions (e.g. UN Security Council reform) and of US 
alliances in the Middle East (including its eventual withdrawal from the region) and a 
more or less nuanced defence of the RtoP doctrine, despite the evident lack of restraint 
shown in the Libyan case. Finally, the Constructivist prism of ‘normative diffusion’ 
allows a less optimistic position than the liberals, by identifying contradictory processes, 
such as those present in the promotion of democracy. These contradictions may lead, for 
example, to authoritarian learning, autocratic regression and change avoidance. Likewise, 
Constructivists question the receptivity of the ‘natural transmitters of norms’ (the North, 
the EU, etc.), as when Arab societies of the South, empowered by the Arab Spring, sent a 
message that shattered the dominant perception of the North (Orientalism). Disruptive 
messages like those sent by Arab Spring actors on the self-representation of Arab 
societies create epistemological uncertainty and cognitive dissonance among those who 
take decisions. These cognitive changes imply a “decolonisation” of western thinking and 
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1 As López-Tapico and Manuel Pastor themselves point out, knowledge is not a synonym 
of approval and the question about the complicity of the CIA has been much more 
debated than the knowledge that, without doubt, the US had through its embassy and the 
secret services field office in Madrid (López-Tapico 2011) (Pastor 2014). 
2 In order to identify the key authors of each paradigm, this chapter has basically 
followed the collective work 'Theories of International Relations' (Arenal and Sanahuja 
2015). 
3 Those particular journals on which the author has worked closely, undertaking an 
exhaustive analysis of the period 2011-15 are followed by an asterisk (*). 
4 For an application of the structure of realist power in the second half of the XX century, 
see for example Sodupe 2002. 
5 In recent years the production of gas and petrol of oil shale in the US has increased at a 
great pace, in a way that the rate of coverage (production over consumption) especially of 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
gas, has risen rapidly. However the US will still need to continue importing petrol to 
cover its needs.  
6 In effect, the Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) in the MENA region (1.5% of GDP) was 
behind that of other regions in development in 2014: Latin America (4%), South-east 
Asia (5.4%), Eastern Africa (4.7%), etc. and of the developing countries average (2.6%). 
If the calculation is made over the total of the DFI, the MENA region only receives 4.5 % 
of the total, and the countries in development 55%. Data from the Statistics Division of 
UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html  [accessed 16/03/2016].  
7 It is clarified below how some liberal/institutionalist authors arrive at similar 
conclusions about the recommendable withdrawal of the US to the east of the Suez Canal. 
Other realists extend criticism of the role of the US in Libya and the application in that 
country of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). 
8 See regarding this current, the criticism of this author by Peter Gowan (Gowan  2000b). 
9 A concept that is principally owed to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, who 
introduced it in the 70s but then continued using it, although in a revised form (Keohane 
and Nye  1977; Keohane and Nye  1987; Keohane and Nye  2015). 
10 Formed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and De Wilde, who studied the 'new security' 
after the Cold War and later coined the concept of ‘securitisation’. 
11 This post-positivist current simultaneously brings together post-modern, post-colonial 
and structuralist Marxist authors. Nevertheless, these authors fall outside this analysis as 
they are more academics and theorists of International Public Law than theorists of 
International Relations. 
12 For a full critique of the considerations of New Left Review and Tariq Ali about 
imperialism in the MENA region, see the interview of the Irish Professor of International 
Relations and MENA specialist, Fred Halliday (1946-2010)  (Halliday  2005). 
